Remedies for non-performance：Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Priniciples and PECL
INTRODUCTION
The growth of international trade makes some kind of unification necessary. Increased trade overseas has drawn attention to the problems that are caused by the different ways in which countries have chosen to regulate international sales. And the legal community has tried to facilitate overseas trade through efforts to harmonize national laws by legislative or non-legislative means.
Against such a background, the analysis in this contribution is focused on the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL -- three of the most important international instruments for the regulation of international commercial transactions which combine elements from both civil law and common law systems. In so doing, this contribution provides a comparative analysis of these instruments. It is merely thought that comparison is, probably, one of the most efficient ways to underline some of the unique features inherent in some legal regimes and to develop solutions to existing theoretical problems. However, as most of the authors dealing with the vast domain of this area would have done, the author in this contribution has never meant to make an exhaustive examination of international commercial law, bearing in mind that the ability of a single contribution to deal with its many issues is limited. The approach offered here is to review some of the key issues frequently befell in international trade, based on those generally accepted principles or elaborate rules as evidenced by international restatements or conventions and usages and practices or so-called lex mercatoria that is widely known to and regularly observed in international commercial transactions.
Particularly, it is said that no aspect of a system of contract law is more revealing of its underlying assumptions than is the law that prescribes the relief available for non-performance (breach). Issues relating to the remedial provisions are difficult and central substantive issues, which will no doubt be the focus of a large part of the discussion and deliberation surrounding application of commercial law on both a domestic and an international level. Therefore, the study in this contribution focuses, in light of traditional and modern theories, on the remedial scheme established under each of the three bodies of rules, namely Part III (partial) of the CISG, Chapter 7 of the UNIDROIT Principles and Chapters 8 and 9 of the PECL. In practical terms, these sectors are the substantive heart of the particular instruments. It is where the corresponding solutions to a large proportion of real world disputes in commercial transactions are to be found.
The comparative analysis contained speculates on the potential similarities and differences of these sectors, intending to enunciate rules which are common in international commercial law and at the same time to select the solutions which seem best adapted to the special requirements of international trade. One should note, however, that to the extent this contribution doesn’t give absolute priority to any one of the three instruments, whenever it is necessary to choose between conflicting rules and sometime then to derive a number of general principles which apply to all of the rules, what’s decisive to the criterion used is not just which rule is mandatory or adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, but rather which of the rules under consideration have the most persuasive value and/or appear to be particularly well suited for international commercial transactions.
Summary of Contents
PART I GENERAL REVIEW
Chapter 1 Sources of Inspiration
Chapter 2 Remedies Available upon Non-performance
PART II PRESERVING PERFORMANCE
Chapter 3 Specific Performance
Chapter 4 Nachfrist for Late Performance
Chapter 5 Cure by Non-performing Party
Chapter 6 Price Reduction for Non-conformity
PART III TERMINATION
Chapter 7 Right to Termination
Chapter 8 Fundamental Non-performance
Chapter 9 Anticipatory Non-performance
Chapter 10 Termination of Breached Installment or Part
Chapter 11 Declaration of Termination
Chapter 12 Effects of Termination
PART IV DAMAGES
Chapter 13 General Measure of Damages
Chapter 14 Limits to Claims for Damages
Chapter 15 Damages upon Termination
Chapter 16 Agreed Payment for Non-performance
Chapter 17 Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees
Chapter 18 Payment of Interest
PART V EXCUSES
Chapter 19 Change of Circumstances
Chapter 20 Force Majeure
Chapter 21 Hardship
Chapter 22 Force Majeure & Hardship Clauses
Table of Contents
PART I GENERAL REVIEW
Chapter 1 Sources of Inspiration
武汉市人民政府办公厅关于转发市国资办等部门拟订的《武汉市年利润百万元以上国有企业经营者年薪制试行办法》的通知
湖北省武汉市人民政府办公厅
武汉市人民政府办公厅关于转发市国资办等部门拟订的《武汉市年利润百万元以上国有企业经营者年薪制试行办法》的通知
武汉市人民政府办公厅
各区人民政府，市人民政府各部门、各直属机构：
市国资办、市经委、市劳动、财政局拟订的《武汉市年利润百万元以上国有企业经营者年薪制试行办法》已报经市人民政府同意，现予转发，请遵照执行。
武汉市年利润百万元以上国有企业经营者年薪制试行办法
第一条 为建立符合社会主义市场经济体制和现代企业制度要求的激励机制和约束机制，培育高素质职业化企业家队伍，充分调动经营者的积极性和创造性，提高国有企业的经营效益和国有资产营运效益，实现国有资产的保值增值，根据财政部、劳动部制定的《国有企业资产经营责任
制暂行办法》和《国有资产保值增值考核试行办法》的有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 试行年薪制应遵守下列基本原则：
一、年薪制与经济效益挂钩；
二、按劳分配，充分体现多劳多得；
三、责任、权利、利益相一致；
四、年薪在严格考核合格后发放；
五、有利于建立经营者激励机制，又与社会经济发展水平和社会承受能力相适应。
第三条 年薪制在我市实行资产经营责任制、年度实现利润在百万元以上的国有企业和国有独资公司法定代表人（兼职法定代表人除外）中试行。
第四条 年薪制是按企业经营年度确定企业法定代表人的基本报酬，并视经营业绩的好差计发其年度的工资制度。
年薪由基薪和风险收入两部分组成。基薪是年度经营的基本报酬，风险收入是年度经营效益的具体体现和年度经营业绩的积累。
基薪根据企业规模确定，小型企业为2万元，中型企业为2．4万元，大型二类企业为2．9万元，大型一类企业为3．5万元，特大联合企业为4．2万元。
风险收入根据资产经营责任书确定的经营业绩考核指标完成情况确定；综合考核评价结果为100％，且企业实现利润在100万元以上500万元以下的，风险收入为3万元；在500万元以上1000万元以下的，风险收入为3．6万元；在1000万元以上2000万元以下的
，风险收入为4．3万元；在2000万元以上4000万元以下的，风险收入为5．2万元；在4000万元以上的，风险收入为6．2万元；综合考核评价结果超过100％的，每超过1个百分点的风险收入为2000元（超过不足1个百分点的，按四舍五入的办法计算）；综合考核
评价结果不满100％的，风险收入为零。
第五条 对企业法定代表人按下列基本程序和办法进行考核：
（一）由企业年薪管理机构与企业法定代表人签订资产经营责任书，确定企业经营责任指标，明确考核依据。
（二）由企业年薪管理机构于年度终了5个月内，委托中介机构对企业经营业绩进行审计、评价，并根据审计报告和企业年度工作报告，对企业经营责任指标完成情况进行考核。
（三）由企业年薪管理机构下达企业法定代表人业绩评定书，对其年度经营业绩作出评语，确定其年度风险收入及年薪总额。
对国有企业法定代表人的考核，按资产经营责任书确定的净资产增长率和净资产收益率考核指标进行；净资产增长率和净资产收益率，按4∶6进行加权后综合计分。
对市国资委授权经营的国有资产营运机构（以下简称营运机构）法定代表人的考核，按《武汉市国有资产营运机构经营业绩考核评价办法（试行）》的规定执行。
第六条 年薪应按下列规定管理：
（一）营运机构的年薪由市国资委管理；营运机构所属企业的年薪由营运机构管理；其他企业的年薪由市国资委委托有关主管部门管理。但营运机构或有关主管部门对企业法定代表人的年薪提出的意见，应报经市国资委审批。
（二）企业法定代表人的基薪列入成本，由所在企业根据经营责任书确定的指标，按月支付现金；风险收入由营运机构或主管部门支付现金，第一年支付70％，余下30％作为风险抵押金，逐年累积，在经过离任审计，确认没有弄虚作假或造成国有资产流失及其他损害的行为后，一
次性发放；存在对国有资产权益产生较大影响的问题，当时不能定性的，结存风险收入延期支付；有弄虚作假或造成国有资产流失及其他损害行为的，根据具体情节，以结存风险收入抵偿；情节严重，造成国有资产较大损失的，依法追究经济、行政或法律责任。
（三）营运机构或主管部门可设立企业法定代表人风险收入的专项基金，用于支付企业法定代表人的风险收入；专项基金经市国资委审批后，从企业收益中收取。
（四）企业法定代表人调动、辞职、退休，或由于其他原因结束任期，应进行离任审计，结算风险收入积累余额。
（五）除政府有特殊规定外，企业法定代表人不得向所在企业领取其他工资性收入，不得同时享有除养老保险、失业保险、医疗保险、住房公积金以外的其他福利性补贴。
（六）企业法定代表人的年薪应照章纳税；其个人所得税由营运机构或主管部门代为扣缴。
（七）试行年薪制的营运机构或有关主管部门，应将所属企业的考核指标、考核方法以及兑现情况，报同级财政、劳动部门备案。
第七条 企业其他行政领导人不试行年薪制，其工资收入，应根据责任轻重、贡献大小，由企业法定代表人提出意见并经董事会审核，报营运机构或有关主管部门批准，并在核定的企业职工工资总额中列支。
第八条 年实现利润百万元以下国有企业法定代表人的年薪，仍按《武汉市国有企业经营者年薪制试行办法》的规定执行。
第九条 本办法由市国资委办公室负责解释。
第十条 本办法自公布之日起施行。
1999年10月9日
